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Two Is Company and Two Can Be a Quorum:
A Reply to Professor Sanchez
Dennis P. Walsh*
Professor John Sanchez has aptly laid out the arguments on both sides
of the issue concerning the authority of the two-member quorum of a three1
member panel to continue issuing decisions. He concludes, however, that
2
the D.C. Circuit reached the correct conclusion based on the plain language
of the statute, i.e., that there must at all times be three members on the
3
NLRB for any group of Board members to make binding decisions. In this
comment, I will not attempt to set forth all of the arguments on the other
side. Those arguments have been thoroughly presented to the Supreme
4
Court in the parties’ briefs in the New Process case, and the Supreme Court
5
has now rendered its decision on the issue. Instead, I will point out the
primary flaws in the rationale of the D.C. Circuit that Professor Sanchez
endorses, and will contend that the Supreme Court should have read the
plain language of the statute to support the Board’s authority to continue to
issue decisions through a two-member quorum of a three-member panel to
which the Board had properly delegated its powers. In addition, I will
briefly address the issue of retroactivity of the Court’s decision, about
which Professor Sanchez speculates in his article.
First, an area of agreement. The Court correctly decided the twomember quorum issue on the basis of the plain language of Section 3(b) of
the Act. The issue of whether the Court should defer to the Board’s inter*
Dennis P. Walsh is currently the Deputy General Counsel at the Federal Labor Relations
Authority. Mr. Walsh previously served as a Member of the National Labor Relations Board on three
different occasions. Mr. Walsh was a Board Member from December 30, 2000 to December 20, 2001
under a recess appointment by President Clinton. He served again from December 17, 2002 to December 16, 2004, after being nominated by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate. He received a
recess appointment to serve as a Member of the Board on January 17, 2006 and served on the Board
until the Senate recessed on December 31, 2007. Mr. Walsh is currently an Adjunct Professor of Labor
Law at Howard University School of Law. Mr. Walsh holds a J.D. from Cornell Law School and a B.A.
from Hamilton College.
1
John Sanchez, Two Is Company but Is It a Quorum?, 5 FIU L. REV. 715 (2010).
2
Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
3
Sanchez, supra note 1, at 720.
4
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, rev’d, No. 081457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010) (No. 08-1457).
5
New Process Steel, No. 08-1457, slip op.
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6

pretation under the Court’s Chevron decision was not addressed in the oral
7
argument. The government, on behalf of the Board, argued that the plain
meaning of the statute supports its interpretation and only argued for defer8
ence as a backup. In any event, it is by no means clear that Chevron deference is even applicable to this issue. As Professor Sanchez notes, two
9
Circuit Courts – the Second and the Tenth – relied on Chevron deference in
upholding the authority of the two-Member quorum. Each court, however,
concluded that Chevron deference was applicable based on the fact that the
statutory language is ambiguous, as evidenced in part by the D.C. Circuit
10
reading it one way, while other courts read it just the opposite. When the
Court speaks of statutory ambiguity in Chevron, however, it is not necessarily referring to semantic ambiguity. Rather, it is referring to the fact that
Congress deliberately left some statutory language unclear, with the intent
that the agency charged with administering the statute would have the
authority to interpret and apply the language based on its accumulated
11
experience and policy judgment. Congress almost certainly did not leave
the language of Section 3(b) ambiguous so that the Board would have the
authority to interpret whether or not it even had the authority to act in the
first place. In fact, while courts have held that administrative agencies,
including the Board, have the authority to determine their own “jurisdiction,” the term “jurisdiction” when used in that sense refers to the extent of
their substantive authority with regard to particular areas of the law, not to
12
their power to act in the first place.
In any event, the simple fact that the words of a statute might be
ambiguous does not necessarily imply that Congress has implicitly
6
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that if
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, courts should accord deference to the
agency delegated the power to interpret the statute if its interpretation is a permissible construction of
the statute).
7
Justice Breyer alluded to the issue when he questioned whether the Court “should” read the
statute to invalidate the two-member decisions, while it could also be read to authorize them. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 15, New Process Steel, L.P. (No. 08-1457). He did not phrase his questions, however, in terms of deference to the Board’s interpretation under Chevron.
8
Brief for Respondent NLRB at 32-34, New Process Steel, L.P., No. 08-1457 (U.S. Feb. 2,
2010).
9
Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 F.3d 849, 850-52 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated No.
09-1404, slip op. (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419-24 (2d Cir.
2009), vacated No. 09-328, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2010).
10 Teamsters Local Union No. 523, 590 F.3d at 852; Snell Island, 568 F.3d at 423-24.
11 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44.
12 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 464 U.S. 822, 830 n.7 (1984). In fact, however, the
Court has not definitively resolved the issue of whether it must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its
statutory authority to regulate a particular area of the law. Compare Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 485 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 386-91 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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delegated to the administrative agency the authority to resolve that ambiguity. Especially when it comes to issues concerning the authority of the
agency to act in the first place, the courts are just as capable of resolving
issues of grammar and semantics as an administrative agency. And the fact
that courts disagree about the meaning of particular sentences and phrases
does not necessarily even mean that they could have different, plausible
meanings; it could very well be that one court is correct and another is not.
In this case, it could be that the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have read the language of Section 3(b) correctly and the D.C.
Circuit has read it incorrectly, or the other way around. Thus, the Supreme
Court itself correctly resolved the conflict based on its view of the correct
way to read the words of the statute.
Professor Sanchez reads the words of the statute the same as the D.C.
Circuit when he concludes that “there must at all times be three members
on the NLRB for any group of Board members to render binding deci13
sions.”
The problem with this interpretation is that it robs the term
“quorum” of its true meaning. A quorum is “the minimum number of
members who must be present for a deliberative assembly to legally
14
transact business.” Thus, for an adjudicatory body, a quorum sets the minimum number of members of the body who must be available to participate
15
in a decision. The D.C. Circuit’s reading, on the other hand, gives the
word an entirely different meaning. Instead of setting a minimum
participation level, the D.C. Circuit (and Professor Sanchez) would read
the word to set a minimum membership level on the Board before any decision could be made. Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, even if the Board
has delegated its authority to a three-member panel, that panel cannot make
decisions with two members if there are no longer three members sitting on
the Board. This interpretation changes a quorum requirement – i.e., the
number of members who must be available to participate in a decision –
into a membership requirement – i.e., the number of members who must be
available, period.
This anomaly can be avoided if the words of the statute are simply
given their ordinary and natural meaning, as the canons of statutory

13 See Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“A three-member Board may delegate its powers to a three-member group, and this delegee group may
act with two members so long as the Board quorum requirement is, ‘at all times,’ satisfied.”).
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1284 (8th ed. 2004).
15 See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating a quorum “is a protection against totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an
unduly small number of persons”) (quoting ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER 16 (3d ed. 1970)).
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16

construction require. The quorum provision in Section 3(b) of the Act
states that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a
quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of
any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof [i.e., the authority
to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers
17
which it may itself exercise].” The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation relies
heavily on the words “at all times.” In that court’s view, “at all times”
means that the Board shall “at all times” have three members, or it cannot
operate at all. This reading, however, fails to give the following phrase,
“except that . . .” any real meaning. If read properly, that phrase establishes
an exception to the three-member quorum requirement when the Board has
delegated its authority to three members. Thus, “at all times” does not truly
mean that the Board must “at all times” have three sitting members,
because the statute sets forth an explicit “exception” to the three-member
quorum requirement.
The D.C. Circuit reads the “except” clause as simply meaning that
there is a different quorum requirement for a three-member group, which
does not create a true exception to the three-member quorum for the full
18
Board. This is the reading, however, that results in the term “quorum”
having an import that is entirely different from its accepted meaning.
Under this interpretation, even if a properly constituted three-member panel
has two members available to make a decision, there is no quorum unless
the Board has at least three of its five slots filled. Thus, the term quorum
would in effect have two different meanings: two members of the panel
would have to be available to make the decision, and three members would
have to be sitting on the Board before that decision could be made. By
failing to understand the two-member quorum requirement as a true exception, the court (and Professor Sanchez) has created an entirely different
meaning for the word “quorum.”
In a very real sense, therefore, the authority of the two-member
quorum of the Board should have turned on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of one word, the word “except,” and how that word fits into the delegation, vacancy, and quorum provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act. In order to
give the word “quorum” its true meaning, in my view, the Court should
have concluded that “except” means “except,” i.e., that it establishes a true
exception to the three-member quorum requirement when the Board has
delegated its powers to a three-member group.
16 See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”).
17 National Labor Relations Act § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).
18 Laurel Baye Healthcare, 564 F.3d at 472.
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Professor Sanchez cites a number of policy concerns in support of his
conclusion that Section 3(b) does not authorize the Board to issue decisions
with a two-member quorum. These include the concern that a two-member
quorum cannot consider decisions involving major policy shifts or changes
in precedent, and the concern that the individual Board members who comprised the two-member quorum have suppressed their personal views and
19
followed current precedent so that the decisions could issue. In essence,
these concerns are based on the view that two members are simply not a
sufficiently representative complement to decide cases at the National
Labor Relations Board. It is Congress, however, that has determined the
absolute minimum number of members that constitute “a protection against
totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small
20
number of persons.” And if the two-member quorum provision is properly
read as an “exception” to the three-member quorum requirement when the
Board’s powers have been delegated to the three-member group, then
Congress has decided the policy issue – i.e., two members are sufficient
protection when such a delegation has been made.
Professor Sanchez also speculates whether the Court’s decision that
the Board lacked a statutory quorum should be retroactive, or prospective
only. He opines that it could be given limited prospective effect, in the
sense that it would apply to “all currently pending NLRB cases plus all
pending appeals from NLRB rulings,” but not to “all previously decided
and unappealed NLRB rulings and rulings appealed, decided and not the
21
subject of a pending cert petition.” However, the problem with only prospectively applying such a ruling – even if the prospective application is
limited – is that, if the Board truly acted without a quorum, it had no
authority to act at all. This would make any decision issued by a two22
member Board a nullity. Any action by the Court that allowed any Board
decisions to stand if they were not issued by a properly constituted quorum
would fly in the face of this principle.
The issue Professor Sanchez raises is more properly considered, in my
view, as a question of whether a party has waived its objection to a Board’s
decision by not raising the two-member quorum issue, either to the Board
itself or on appeal to a circuit court. The weight of authority would seem to
indicate that the issue cannot be waived. The D.C. Circuit has held that
19

Sanchez, supra note 1, at 732.
Assure Competitive Transp., 629 F.2d at 473.
21 Sanchez, supra note 1, at 734.
22 See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 79 (2003) (stating that decision by improperly constituted panel of Circuit Court is an action that the Court never had authority to take in first place); R.R.
Yardmasters of Am. v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that issue of agency’s
composition concerns question of agency’s power to act at all).
20

744

FIU Law Review

[5:739

issues concerning the composition of an agency, and thus its power to act at
all, cannot be waived by failing to raise them with the agency itself before
23
appealing to the courts. And the Supreme Court held that the failure to
raise the issue of the proper composition of a circuit court of appeals before
the circuit court itself did not waive a party’s right to raise it for the first
24
time before the Supreme Court. Thus, since they are still appealable to the
circuit courts, Board decisions decided by the two-member quorum remain
vulnerable to challenge based on the Court’s ruling that they were not
25
properly decided. Indeed, Section 10(f) of the Act contains no deadline
for filing a petition for review of a Board decision, so this would mean that
an appeal of such decisions could be filed at any time.
Because the Court decided in New Process that the two-member
quorum was not empowered to issue decisions, it has left the newly constituted Board to determine what it will do with the remaining decisions that
were decided by two members. As Professor Sanchez quite aptly describes,
its choice is either to ratify those decisions based on a cursory review –
which would leave them open to possible challenge on due process grounds
– or to start at square one with every decision – which would increase the
Board’s backlog at a time when it has many important issues before it.
26
Neither proposition is very attractive. Instead, if the Court had properly
read Section 3(b) as embodying a true two-member quorum exception when
the Board properly delegates its authority to a three-member panel, then
today’s Board would have been free to focus on important questions of
labor-management policy in its current caseload.

23 See Mitchell v. Christopher, 996 F.2d 375, 378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1993); R.R. Yardmasters, 721 F.2d
at 1337-39.
24 Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 78-79.
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2006).
26 In fact, the newly constituted Board seems to have taken an approach somewhere in between
these extremes. It has asked the circuit courts to remand all of the cases that were challenged on the
basis of the lack of a quorum, and it has assigned those cases for consideration by a panel consisting of
Members Liebman and Schaumber, both of whom were on the two-member panel that originally
decided them, and one of the new members of the Board. See NLRB Press Release, NLRB Outlines
Plans for Considering 2-Member Cases in Wake of Supreme Court Ruling (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2010/R-2762.pdf.

